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Abstract – Steer-by-wire systems must meet not only 
reliability but also real-time requirements. This paper 
presents an integrated approach for evaluating both the 
temporal performance and the behavioral reliability of 
Steer-by-wire systems taking into account the delay 
variation introduced by network transmission errors. The 
considered temporal performance is the Quality of Service 
perceived by the user, i.e. the vehicle stability. Tests in 
vehicles and simulations have been realized to estimate the 
maximum tolerable response time of the system, and to 
evaluate the impact of this delay on the Quality of  Service. 
We quantify then the worst case response time of the 
system for a generic architecture based on TDMA protocol 
but independent of the communication network (could 
actually be TTP/C or FlexRay), and apply these generic 
results to a case study. We further define the notion of 
“behavioral reliability” as the probability that “the worst 
case response time is less than a threshold”. In our case 
study this behavioral reliability is evaluated and linked to 
the Safety Integrity Levels defined in IEC61508-1 standard. 
Based on this behavioral reliability concept, the final 
objective of our work is to propose a new dependability 
analysis method for X-by-Wire systems by taking into 
account both dynamic performance, fault-tolerance 




Car makers are introducing X-By-Wire systems to 
replace mechanical controls and linkages. Such 
embedded electronic systems must satisfy both stringent 
real-time performance and reliability requirements.  
                                                 
1 This work is supported by the grant ANRT N°582/2001 
LORIA - PSA Peugeot-Citroën 
An automotive Steer-By-Wire (SBW) system is safety-
critical and the first thing a car maker should prove is that 
the SBW system embedded in a produced car has a very 
small probability to have a failure. Although regulating 
organisms have not yet established the automotive-
specific requirement on this probability but the 10-9 
failures/hour from the regulators of the commercial 
aircraft industry seems to be adopted [Ham03], [Wil03].  
According to [Lap92], a system is dependable if a user 
interacting with the system has good reasons to trust the 
service the system delivers. The safety is the probability 
that the system will not cause severe damage to humans 
or substantial economic loss. The reliability, probability 
that a system will fulfil the service a user expects, is 
computed with the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) 1/λ (λ 
is called failure rate) according to the failure distribution: 
R(t) = P(1/λ>t). So, depending on the mission phase of 
the vehicle, the safety can sometimes be considered as the 
reliability of the system. For given MTTF of the 
components (Sensors, Computers, Network links, 
actuators) and their redundancy, static reliability analysis 
can give the total reliability of the SBW system. However 
a static reliability of less than 10-9 is a necessary 
condition but as we show below it is not a sufficient one. 
For example, transient faults aren’t treated in these kinds 
of evaluation as well as the time consideration. [Zwi99] 
added that the transitions between a nominal mode and a 
failure mode can be progressive, sudden or random, 
however the reliability doesn’t know the notion of partial 
or progressive failure.  
In fact, a SBW system is also time-critical and its timely 
reactivity  directly impacts on the safety of the car. For 
instance the delay introduced by a SBW system between 
a driver’s request and the activation of the wheels can be 
considered as a performance measure until a certain 
threshold value but must be considered as a dependability 
measure when the delay is beyond this threshold value 
since in this case the driver could totally loss the control 
of his car ! So only the reliability of 10-9 is not sufficient 
and the real-time performance should also be evaluated.  
Note that X-by-Wire systems usually integrate a lot of 
fault tolerant mechanisms; not only static redundancy, but 
also dynamic reconfiguration, acknowledgement of 
transmitted messages, software diversifications, etc. All 
these services contribute to achieve the dependability. But 
their impact on the dependability is difficult to evaluate. 
Some work [Ham03] considers these services with a 
Fault-Tolerance Coverage Rate. But the main problem is 
that with X-by-Wire systems, we haven't any experience 
feedback, so it seems complicated to give a coverage rate 
to a fault-tolerant service, even if it is possible for some 
of them.  
So, if it is today established that the reliability is a static 
measure which is independent of the dynamic behaviour 
of the system, we can consider a new kind of reliability 
which is dependant on the past and present events. This 
new measure, which can vary during the time, will be 
named “Behavioural Reliability”. 
Classic performance evaluation and reliability analysis are 
two separate studies on the same system. However as we 
have explained above, the total dependability is a function 
of these two aspects. Moreover, transient faults such as 
transmission errors may lead to degrading the 
performance of the system or even transgressing the 
dependability.  Therefore some integrated dependability 
measures are necessary. The difficulty is how to combine 
these two aspects into an integrated approach.  
Some methods go in this direction. HRT-HOOD [Bur95] 
proposes to integrate the schedulability analysis into the 
dependability study but without taking into account the 
dynamic performance and transient failures. GUARDS 
(Generic Upgradable Architecture for Real-Time 
Dependable Systems) (ESPRIT project 20716) [Pow99] 
has objective to develop a generic design architecture for 
real-time dependable systems by integrating performance 
evaluation into classic dependability analysis. However 
the methods are only put together and there lack links 
between different results produced by the different 
methods. HIDE (High-Level Integrated Design 
Environment for Dependability) (ESPRIT Project 
227493) [HID98] does more on the integration of the 
methods by using a common UML-based model 
description allowing thus the automatic generation of 
analysable sub-models on Petri net and Kripke structures. 
However because of the complexity of the tool, the sub-
models generated are not easily analysable. PALBUS 
project [PAL01] tried to give a framework to X-by-Wire 
system design. The main advantage of PALBUS project 
is that it gives an overview of the recent work addressing 
the X-by-Wire dependability problematic, at every level 
of the design process (architecture, software, testing…). 
Our main idea for integrating these two aspects is based 
on the data validity and its timely delivering perceived by 
the data consumer (actuator). Redundancy of network 
links and producers of a same datum (sensors) could thus 
be seen as increased data validity probability and 
transient faults such as loss of a data packet by network 
as an increased data delivery delay. 
The main objective of this study is to propose an 
integrated method for evaluating both the real-time 
performance and the “Behavioural Reliability” of the 
system. The criteria evaluated is the Quality of Service 
(QoS) as perceived by the user according to the response 
time of the system, considering that this response time 
can also impact the availability and in the worst case, the 
safety.  In fact, if the response time of the system is too 
important, the safety of the user can be impacted. Then, 
we also quantify the probability of impacting the user’s 
safety by means of Behavioural Reliability. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, 
for generic SBW architectures with TDMA-based 
communication protocol (could actually be FlexRay, 
TTP/C…), we present the method to quantify the Worst 
Case Pure Delay and its relation with the Quality of 
Service and the Behavioural Reliability. In section 3 we 
propose a realistic study case with an example of SBW 
architecture and its temporal characteristics. According to 
the corresponding hypothesis, we apply the method and 
present the obtained results. Section 4 concludes this 
study and points out the future work by replacing our 
study within a more general context. 
 
2. PRESENTATION OF THE METHOD 
 
The main objective of this study is to propose a method to 
evaluate the Behavioural Reliability of the system. The 
criteria evaluated is the QoS depending on the response 
time of the system, considering that this response time 
can also impact the availability and in the worst case, the 
safety.  
We first define the pure delay introduced by a SBW 
system between the hand wheel request to the reception 
of the driver’s request by the front axles actuators (Fig.1). 
 
 
Figure 12: Steer-by-Wire system 
 
The total response time of the system hand wheel request 
and front axle response is divided into the pure delay and 


















Response Time Pure Delay Mechatronicdelay
Figure 2: Steer-by-Wire system response time 
 
The mechatronic delay is the time necessary for the 
actuator to reach the front axle position and the pure 
delay is directly related to the “by-wire” operation 
(processing time in the ECUs (Electronic Control Unit), 
network delay, …) (figure 2). As we consider that the 
mechatronic delay is constant, we will only analyze the 
impact of the pure delay on the Quality of Service. 
 
A. Impact of the pure delay on the QoS 
PSA Peugeot Citroën has realised a series of tests in 
vehicle to evaluate the impact of the pure delay on the 
QoS with an embedded SBW system. The QoS relative 
to the prestation of the system like variable 
demultiplication of the force applied to the wheel, or 
feedback force are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Simulations have also been realised on Matlab Simulink 
with injection of parameters perceived by the user during 
                                                 
2 Picture taken from: www.delphi.com 
the tests. An estimated model ∆3 has been deduced, that 
gives a relationship between the QoS "as perceived by 
the user" and the pure delay of the SBW system. Such a 
model is used to dimension actuators, sensors and 
processing delay in mechatronic systems like electrical 
assisted steering. 
The parameters injected in this model are the time 
necessary to reach the desired position and the vehicle 
stability according the 3D axis represented in figure 3. 
The QoS is then estimated as a score denoted by N 
according to the time dedicated to reach the desired 
position and stability. Until a certain limit the QOS is 
“acceptable” (the delay is not impacting the user 
sensitivity). After this limit, the safety of the user is not 
guaranteed. In fact, the availability of the function 
“turning the wheels according to the user’s will” can 
impact the safety of the user after a certain delay. 
Figure 3: stabilisation of the vehicle according to the 3 
axis 
 
According to theses considerations, the table 1 has been 
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Steer-by-Wire 5 11.21 
Steer-by-Wire 10 11.19 
Steer-by-Wire 15 11.15 
Steer-by-Wire 20 11.13 
Steer-by-Wire 25 11.10 
Steer-by-Wire 30 11.05 
Steer-by-Wire 35 11 
Steer-by-Wire  50 10.90 




Table 1: QoS score vs. Pure Delay 
 
Table 1 shows the relation between the score N given to 
the system and the pure delay recorded, but it also shows 
the critical limit for the pure delay: after this limit, the 
safety of the driver can be impacted. This critical limit 
has been detected at 35 ms for pure delay. We notice that 
this limit of 35 ms is specific a vehicle type so readers 
should not consider it as available for theirs. All these 
results will be the criteria for the proposed method. 
 
B. Hypothesis 
We will only consider here the functionality of “turning 
the wheels according to the user’s will”. For this control 
chain we identified four functions: 
- F1: Hand wheel position acquisition 
- F2: Front axle activation 
- F3 : Hand wheel measure treatment 
- F4: Front axle order computation 
As well as the information flow between these functions 
(Fig. 4). The behaviour of each function is specified 
according to the control law and the coordination 
between them follows time-triggered approach. 
 
F1 F3 F4 F2
 
 
Figure 4: Functional Architecture (FA) 
 
The implementation of this FA respects the following 
hypothesis: 
- Distribution of functions on separate 
equipments (F1 on sensor, F2 on actuator, F3 
and F4 on Electronic Control Units) 
- Replication of each function (so replication of 
equipments) 
- Flow exchange ensured by a TDMA-like 
communication protocol 
- Algorithms on each equipment are periodically 
activated and if replicated inputs exist the 
activation is assumed at the end of the last input 
of the period 
The information is transmitted from the Hand Wheel 
Sensor to the Front Axle Actuator through different 
nodes via network. Sensors and actuators are assumed 
directly linked to an ECU via point to point links. For 
the considered control chain, the first node is always the 
Hand Wheel ECU - or the replicated Hand Wheel ECUs 
– and the last the Front Axle ECU (figure 1). Between 
these ones, central ECUs can exist.  
The access of each ECU to the network is organized in a 
cyclic way with a macro cycle which is composed of 
several micro cycles, each micro cycle being divided 
into slots: 
- TMA is the duration of a macro cycle 
- TMI is the duration of a micro cycle 
- A macro cycle of communication is composed 
of n micro cycles: TMA = nTMI . 
- A node is allowed to access the communication 
medium one time per micro cycle, in a 
predefined and static temporal window (a slot). 
- For a given node, an information is delivered 
one time per macro cycle (but the same 
information can be delivered several times per 
macro cycle if replicated nodes deliver 
replicated information). 
The actuator begins to reach the desired position on the 
Front Axle when it has received all the replicated 
information (it waits for the last replicated information). 
 
C. “Worst Case Pure Delay” without transmission errors 
We generally use the notion of the worst case response 
time when the objective is to dimension real-time 
systems. However, in this study, what really impacts the 
QoS is the variation of the pure delay. We will study the 
“worst case pure delay” denoted by TWCPD, first in 
nominal mode (without faults).   
As the macro cycles are predefined and cyclic, the pure 
delay is not the same whether the hand wheel stimulus 
arrives at the beginning of the cycle or at the end, that’s 
why a “worst case pure delay” exists. As we consider the 
function “turning the wheels according to the user’s 
will”, we can assert that the “worst case pure delay” 
appears when the stimulus is given at the beginning of 
the first temporal window reserved for a Hand Wheel 
ECU in the macro cycle. In fact, it is the worst case 
because the treated information is the last received from 
the sensor just before this temporal window. So, the 
stimulus given at the beginning of the first temporal 
window reserved for a Hand Wheel ECU in the macro 
cycle has to wait for the treatment of the last information 
plus a macro cycle (see example 3.B).  The treatment of 
the last information will last from the beginning of the 
first temporal window reserved for a Hand Wheel ECU 
in the macro cycle until the end of the last temporal 
window that contains the information in its final form 
for being treated by the actuator (see example 3.B), we 
call it TNET added to the treatment time of the Front Axle 
ECU TT.  
 
So we can assert that: 
TWCPD = TNET + TT + TMA 
TWCPD = TNET + TT + nTMI  (1) 
This result should be used for the system dimensioning 
during the design step in order that TWCPD is smaller than 
the deadline (e.g. 35 ms for the example of Table 1). 
 
D.  “Worst Case Pure Delay” with transmission errors 
Our study considers an error the fact that the information 
is delayed because of diverse faults as EMI perturbation, 
or physical faults on the ECUs or sensors. If the 
information is delayed, it will be translated by an empty 
or erroneous (we treat it as an identical case) slot 
(temporal window). But, as the information is replicated 
in different slots, for the actuator, the information is 
considered as lost only if all the replicated slots are 
empty or erroneous. So, with our hypothesis, an error 
will be translated by the lost of a macro cycle. From a 
temporal point of view, for every error,  TMA will be 
added to the precedent pure delay. 
As an error burst can impact consecutive macro-cycles, 
the more the error burst is longer, the more the pure 
delay is augmented. So we study the response of the 
system to the sequences with valid and erroneous macro 
cycles.  
The erroneous macro cycles are assumed independent 
events and the probability of losing one macro cycle can 
be calculated given the frame error rate (or equivalent to 
the slot error rate).  
If ER is the frame error rate, and if the information is 
replicated r times per macro cycle, it can be shown that 
the probability of losing a macro cycle is (ER)
r. It is 
worth noting that this result remains valid for whatever 
distribution of the r slots (or frames) within a macro 
cycle. 
For time varying frame error rate (e.g. burst error arrival 
pattern in [Nav00]), more complicated mathematical 
analysis should be used to deduce the probability of 
losing a macro cycle. This is beyond the scope of our 
paper. 
So we only focus on the study of the response of the 
system to a sequence of valid and erroneous macro-cycles 
by using the following approach similar to that in 
[Jum03], which defines a explicit formal relation between  
a failure of the control system and a failure of the 
regulated system in the simple case of a tankwater Let us 
consider a sequence (εi, εi+1, …, εi+n), such as εi ∈[0 ;1]. 
For example, the sequence (0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) corresponds 
to 2 valid macro cycles, and 2 erroneous macro cycles, 
and finally 4 valid macro cycles. 
If εi = 1, we have lost one macro cycle, so TMA will be 
added to the precedent pure delay. Consequently, the 
response TERR to such a sequence is: 
TERR(i) = (1- εi )TWCPD +εi.TERR (i-1)+εi.TMA 
 
According to equation (1) we have 
TERR(i) = (1-εi)(TNET+TT+nTMI )+εi.TERR (i-1)+εi.nTMI   (2) 
 
(if εi  = 1, then we add the elapsed time corresponding to 
the number of erroneous macro cycles  
if εi  = 0, the pure delay is TWCPD (see relation (1)) 
 
E. Behavioural reliability evaluation 
 As TERR(i) is random and time varying, it is not always 
possible to dimension the system for meeting the 
requirement of TERR(i) < Deadline for Ν∈∀i . So we 
propose to evaluate the probability of meeting this 
requirement. 
According to Table 1, if TERR(i) > 35 ms, the safety is 
impacted. In terms of the dependability, we can then 
study the probability of having the event TERR(i) > 35 ms. 
[Wil03] indicates that the probability of having such an 
event (event that can impact the safety of the user) must 
be inferior to 10 –9 per hour. So, in addition to the QoS 
evaluation, our method can also be used to analyse if the 
studied system verifies the reliability requirements. This 
measure is called behavioural reliability as the event of 
TERR(i) > 35 ms is only because of the dynamically 
occurred transmission errors but not because of the 
system design. 
We define: 
- D= maximum tolerable pure delay 
- PBR= behavioural reliability 
- SIL= Safety Integrity Level of the system 
So the Behavioural Reliability is calculated by: 
 
PBR =P[TERR(i) > D]  (3) 
 
This probability can be directly used to determine the SIL 











Probability of dangerous failure 
per hour (PFAIL) 
4 ≥ 10-9  to < 10-8 
3 ≥ 10-8  to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
 
 
Table 2: Safety Integrity Levels [IEC] 
 
The CEI61508 [IEC] determines the Safety Integrity 
Levels (SIL) for safety related systems in term of 
probability of dangerous failure per hour. The 
requirements for X-by-Wire systems are discussed in 
[Wil03] and different SILs can be given for every high-
level functions.  
So, for the studied function and the corresponding SILi, 
we must have:  
PBR < PFAIL[SILi]  (4) 
 
3. CASE STUDY 
 
To illustrate our proposition, this following case study is 
considered showing how to apply our method to a SBW 
architecture (figure 3) . 
 





































Legend :  
  TDMA network 
  Point to point link 
as: hand wheel angle and speed sensors  
HW actuator : Hand Wheel actuators for Force Feedback 
ECU : nodes 
FAA : front axle actuators 
rps : front axle position sensors 
 
The chosen architecture seems a realistic one for 
commercial vehicles. In fact, a lot of SBW architectures 
are presented with central ECU between the Hand Wheel 
and the Front Axle [ESP98], but in terms of cost it seems 
not to be very realistic for mass production. That’s why 
we have chosen an architecture with only four ECUs 
(Fig. 5). This architecture is constructed with three Hand 
Wheel Sensors connected to two Hand Wheel ECUs, a 
Time-Triggered communication network, two Front Axle 
ECUs connected to three sensors.  Hand Wheels ECUs 
are also connected to 2 actuators for the Force Feedback, 
and Front Axles ECUs are connected to actuators to turn 
the wheels.  
Treatments in redundant ECUs are made in parallel. For 
example, ECU HWA1 and ECU HWA2 (Fig. 5) receive 
the data from the sensors synchronously, so they treat it at 
the same time. The figure 6 shows that during temporal 
window HWA1, ECU HWA1 and ECU HWA2 are 
treating data in parallel. 
 
B. Temporal characteristics 
Hypothesis: 
- duration of a micro cycle : TMI  = 4ms 
- duration of a macro cycle : TMA  = 8ms 
- number of micro cycles per macro cycle: n = 2 
- every slot has the same duration: 1ms 
- TNET (form the beginning of the first temporal 
window reserved for a Hand Wheel ECU in the 
macro cycle until the end of the last temporal 
window that contains the information in its final 
form for being treated by the actuator)= 2 ms 
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Figure 6: Temporal characteristics of the function “turning the wheels according to the user’s will” 
 
We now have enough information to apply the method 
of evaluation of the QoS presented in section 2. 
 
C. “Worst Case Pure Delay” without transmission errors 
We recall the hypothesis: 
- TMI = 8ms 
- n = 2 
- TNET = 4ms 
- TT = 1ms 
So, according to the relation (1), the “Worst Case Pure 
Delay” TWCPD of the proposed system is: 
TWCPD = TNET + TT + nTMI  = 21 ms 
This means that the studied SBW system provides in the 
worst case (without transmission errors) a QoS of about 
11 according to Table 1. 
 
D. “Worst Case Pure Delay” with transmission errors 
It is quite difficult to fix a frame error rate today, mainly 
because the experience feedback for steer-by-wire 
systems is quite reduced, with new fault tolerant 
mechanisms such as the redundancy of the transmission 
channels. Moreover, this will be one of the next step of 
our work. So we developed a software to simulate the 
response of the system to a sequence of different macro 
cycles with increasing error rate according to the 
hypothesis of the precedent paragraph. To every pure 
delay corresponds the score of the QoS according to 
Table 1. So, by averaging the obtained scores, we can 
deduce and score that is representative of the QoS score 
of the studied system.. 
 






10-3 10-4 10-5 10-7 
11,13 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-7 
11,05 106 10-8 10-10 10-14 







Table 3: QoS score of the system in function different 
error rates  
 
Table 3 shows the different probability of reaching a 
QoS score at an instant t during the exploitation of the 
system, in function the macro cycle error rate. We 
restrict the study with a macro cycle error bounded by 
10-3 because it seems to be the most realistic values. 
 
E. Behavioral Reliability Evaluation 
As explained above, the frame error rate is for the 
moment difficult to quantify, that’s why we evaluated 
the probability of having the event TERR(i) > 35 ms  in 
function of different macro cycle error rates (Figure7). 
  
Figure 7: Probability PBR of having the event           
TERR(i) > 35ms  in function of different error rates 
 
The analysis of the curve shows that for a macro cycle 
error rate of less than 10-3, the studied system meet the 
requirements of SIL 4 (Table 2). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The method presented in this paper is the first step 
towards to a more global work aiming to define a method 
for the dependability and Quality of Service evaluation of 
X-by-Wire systems taking into account both dynamic 
performance, fault-tolerance mechanisms and static 
redundancy of the system. The present paper shows that it 
is possible to integrate dynamic performance behavior 
such as response time variation into the dependability 
evaluation. Moreover, the presented method evaluates the 
QoS of the system, then, if two architectures verify both 
the dependability requirements, it is possible to compare 
them according to their QoS. This paper also introduce 
the notion of “behavioural reliability”: even if the event 
“not performing the specified functionality within a 
specific time frame” is a failure - so the probability that 
this failure appears can be simply quantified by 
evaluating the MTTF -, as the specific time frame can 
vary according to the mission phase of the vehicle, the 
scheduling, and other dynamic parameters, this notion is 
different from the static reliability usually quantified. 
However, static aspects such as the redundancy and the 
reliability of the components (ECUs, Communication 
medium, etc.) are indispensable for dependability 
evaluation. So, the next step of our work will be to inject 
these considerations into our method. 
Fault Tolerant mechanisms, either proposed by the 
communication protocol or implemented in the ECUs 
[Ham03], change dynamically the performance of the 
system. They will also have to be included in the method. 
This is another consequent part of the future work. A lot 
of studies [Rus01] are provided today in this topic, 
mainly focused on the comparison of the protocols for X-
by-Wire systems: TTP/C and FlexRay. Evaluating the 
impact of  the fault tolerant mechanisms of both the 
communication protocol and ECUs on the global 
dependability is a very ambitious challenge. 
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